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Introduction
Analysing subsidies has always been an issue of debate 
in agricultural economics. On the one hand, subsidies pro-
vide incentives to enable changes that cannot otherwise hap-
pen. On the other hand, agricultural economists are sceptical 
regarding the eﬀ ectiveness of agricultural subsidies, often 
considering them too expensive, poorly targeted, distortive 
and path dependent (Baltzer and Hansen, 2011).
Although agricultural policy programmes are hard to 
evaluate for several reasons (e.g. conﬂ icting objectives, lack 
of clear goals, indirect eﬀ ects, political interests etc.), many 
empirical studies have analysed the eﬀ ects of agricultural 
policies on farm structures (Ahearn et al., 2005; Kim et al., 
2005; Feichtinger and Salhofer; 2013). Despite the obvious 
importance of the topic in agricultural policy making, Ahearn 
et al. (2005) conclude that “our understanding of how gov-
ernment policies have aﬀ ected the structure of agriculture, 
or how future policies could be designed to promote speciﬁ c 
outcomes, remains limited” (p.1182).
In line with the diversity of agricultural policy pro-
grammes, empirical studies analysed diﬀ erent aspects of gov-
ernment subsidies in agriculture. Baltzer and Hansen (2011), 
for instance, analysed large scale input subsidy programmes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and concluded that the popularity of 
these subsidies is mainly due to their political attractiveness 
rather than economic superiority. Banful (2011) went further, 
suggesting that political powers ‘watered down’ the eﬀ ec-
tiveness of fertiliser subsidy programmes in Ghana. By con-
trast, Huang et al. (2011), analysing the impact of China’s 
agricultural subsidies, found that input subsidies appear to be 
non-distorting in terms of producer decisions.
Rada and Valdes (2012) showed that the beneﬁ ts of agri-
cultural research have been most rapidly adopted by the most 
eﬃ  cient farms, while other public policies including rural 
credit and infrastructure investments, favoured ‘average’ 
producers. Minviel and Latruﬀ e (2014) found that targeted 
investment subsidies were positively associated with farm’s 
technical eﬃ  ciency, while Bojnec and Latruﬀ e (2013) found 
that agricultural subsidies reduced the technical eﬃ  ciency 
of Slovenian farms but improved their proﬁ tability. Zhu and 
Lansink (2010) analysed the impact of European Union (EU) 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies on the techni-
cal eﬃ  ciency of crop farms in selected EU Member States 
and also found mixed results.
Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) analysed the welfare eﬀ ects 
of agricultural subsidies in the ten Member States that joined 
the EU in 2004 by analysing their land markets and found 
land-related payments ineﬀ ective and distortive. In an over-
view on the inﬂ uence of agricultural support on agricultural 
land prices, Feichtinger and Salhofer (2013) concluded that 
a considerable share of farm subsidies were absorbed by the 
land owners rather than by the operating farmers.
Kaditi (2013) analysed the impact of the CAP reforms on 
farm labour structure in Greece and found that agricultural 
support measures negatively aﬀ ected demand for both family 
and hired labour. The paper also found that structural labour 
adjustments were the result of farm characteristics such as 
farm size and location. In their analysis of the eﬀ ects of the 
2003 reform of the CAP on Irish farmers’ oﬀ -farm labour 
market decisions, Hennessy and Rehman (2008) found that 
decoupling of direct payments was likely to increase the 
probability of farmers participating in the oﬀ -farm employ-
ment market and that the amount of time allocated to oﬀ -
farm work would increase.
Brady et al. (2009) analysed the impact of decoupled 
direct payments on biodiversity and landscape and found that 
eliminating the link between support payments and produc-
tion had only limited negative consequences for the land-
scape. They suggested that these eﬀ ects could be oﬀ set by 
strengthening (CAP Pillar II) agri-environmental schemes. 
Mayrand et al. (2003), investigating the environmental 
impacts of U.S. agricultural subsidy programmes, showed 
that higher subsidies had led to an intensiﬁ cation of agricul-
tural production which is detrimental to environmental sus-
tainability. In addition, they concluded that in most countries 
agricultural support remained largely concentrated on mar-
ket price support and output/input-based payments, which 
are the most environmentally harmful categories of subsi-
dies. Harvey and Hubbard’s (2013) analysis of the political 
economy of animal welfare programmes found them to be 
ineﬃ  cient. The authors suggested that conventional argu-
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ments for government interventions are misleading.
There is considerable criticism of the present policy sys-
tems, especially the major ones such as the CAP and the U.S. 
Farm Bill. Most authors ﬁ nd that most current agricultural 
subsidies are ineﬃ  cient and out-dated, though there is no 
consensus how to reform them (see e.g. Chau and de Gorter, 
2005; Harvey and Jambor, 2011; Tangermann, 2011).
Overall, the empirical ﬁ ndings are rather mixed. On the 
one hand, agricultural policy programmes have succeeded in 
raising farmers’ use of inputs, productivity and incomes. On 
the other hand, they have been extremely expensive. Subsi-
dies have tended to beneﬁ t those who are relatively well oﬀ  
and farmers have become dependent on continued govern-
ment support.
In the above context, this article analyses the impact of 
Albanian agricultural subsidies on farm development and 
decision making. It adds to the existing literature in three 
ways: (a) it uses an up-to-date survey dataset; (b) it tests the 
eﬀ ectiveness of agricultural subsidies in one country; and (c) 
it analyses agricultural subsidies in a country aiming to join 
the EU. To the best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁ rst time that 
such an in-depth analysis has been carried out for Albania.
This study focuses on the olive and vineyard sectors 
which are among the most important and fastest growing 
agri-food sectors in Albania. Olive production has increased 
signiﬁ cantly in recent years, from 27,600 tonnes in 2007 to 
about 100,000 tonnes in 2012. Since then, there has been a 
marked expansion of plantings stimulated by national sup-
port schemes and the number of olive tree production areas 
has increased by approximately 60 per cent. Grape produc-
tion has also increased signiﬁ cantly, by almost one third 
compared to 2007 (MARDWA, 2014). Both sectors have 
absorbed signiﬁ cant government subsidies – they were the 
most important sectors that were targeted by the ﬁ rst subsidy 
support measures.
Hypotheses
Based the foregoing, the following hypotheses are 
advanced:
1. Government subsidy has a positive impact on pro-
duction capacity. Standard microeconomic theory 
suggests that reduction in investment costs will lead 
to increased production capacity. Stiglitz’s (1987) 
argument of subsidy ‘incentive’ supports the idea 
that subsidies in agriculture inevitably inﬂ uence the 
behaviour to allocate eﬀ ort and other resources to 
agriculture. Whereas ‘early’ agricultural programmes 
tend to encourage agricultural production growth, 
recent versions tend to decouple support from pro-
duction levels (Anderson et al., 2013; Anderson and 
Valenzuela, 2013). In this respect, we assume Alba-
nia’s agricultural policy to be at the ‘early’ stage.
2. Government subsidy will result in improved techni-
cal eﬃ  ciency. According to the empirical literature, 
the impact of subsidy on technical eﬃ  ciency – output 
maximisation for unit of input – is rather mixed (Zhu 
and Lansink, 2010; Rada and Valdes, 2012; Bojnec 
and Latruﬀ e, 2013; Minviel and Latruﬀ e, 2014). Our 
results can contribute to the inconclusive debate on 
the impact of subsidy on technical eﬃ  ciency.
3. Government subsidy encourages land and labour use. 
One of the justiﬁ cations of trade protection for devel-
oping countries is that higher domestic prices will 
lead to an upward movement of the production pos-
sibility frontier as a result of bringing idle resources, 
namely land and labour, into the economic cycle. 
This is actually a ‘second best’ policy that solves the 
problem indirectly (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994). 
Though investment subsidy is also a ‘second best’ 
policy (government supports farmers to increase 
the area planted without intervening directly in the 
land and labour market), it is closer to the ‘problem 
source’ and is therefore expected to motivate farm-
ers to use idle resources. Furthermore, in Albania, a 
large share of agriculture land has not been subject 
to formal property registration (Zhllima and Imami, 
2012), which makes access to ﬁ nance and loan very 
diﬃ  cult (lack of collateral). Thus, (in addition to loan 
guarantees) subsidies can be an important way of 
enabling such farmers to fund investments, which in 
turn can allow the use of idle land and labour as well 
as contribute to an increase in production capacity 
(hypothesis 1).
Methodology
Propensity score matching procedure
Quasi-experimental design using a propensity score 
matching (PSM) method was used to create two similar 
groups from a randomly-selected sample, one composed of 
subsidised farmers (treated group) and another composed of 
non-subsidised farmers (control group). 
Conceptually, PSM is based on the counterfactual 
approach. From a pool of treated and control group subjects, 
PSM permits observations on treated subjects that are (on 
average) similar to the control group subjects on as many 
criteria as possible with the exception of the treatment itself. 
Following the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985), 
Rubin and Thomas (1996), Sekhon (2011), and Ho et al. 
(2011), PSM has become an increasingly popular approach 
to estimate causal eﬀ ects in impact evaluation.
PSM is a three-stage process. The fi rst stage entails 
estimating the propensity score, which is the probability of 
receiving treatment conditional upon observed independ-
ent variables or covariates. This probability is found by 
regressing membership in the treated versus control group 
(dependent variable) on a set of observed independent 
(covariates or predictors) variables by means of a logit or 
probit regression.
In the propensity score procedure using logit regression, 
our dependent variable was ‘S_2008’, which is a dummy/
binary variable taking the value 1 for farmers who have 
received government subsidy in 2008 and 0 for the ones not 
having received subsidy during the same year. The inde-
pendent variables or covariates that were used to regress the 
membership to treatment versus control group are described 
in Table 1.
Government subsidies impact assessment in Albania
121
The nearest neighbour matching procedure of MatchIt 
software (Ho et al., 2011), an R package was used to create 
two similar groups. Several matching procedures were run 
(simple matching, matching using ‘caliper’ 0.251, matching 
without caliper with replacement in control groups at ratio 2 
(allowing matching of one control member for two treatment 
group members), and matching with replacement and caliper 
0.25) before choosing the second as the one which better bal-
ances treated and control group.
The second stage is matching the treated subjects to the 
control subjects in such a way that the two groups are similar 
for all covariates represented by the propensity score meas-
ure. In general this entails matching treated with control indi-
viduals using similar propensity scores. Various algorithms 
are available for the matching procedure, including nearest 
neighbour matching with replacement and without replace-
ment (one treated case for one control case), radius match-
ing, kernel matching, stratiﬁ cation matching and others.
An important tool to assess whether covariate balance 
has been achieved is the standardised absolute bias, which is 
calculated as absolute bias:
 (1)
where  and  are the means of a given covariate for 
the treated and the control subject, respectively. Likewise, 
 and  are the respective standard deviations of the 
given covariate. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) have sug-
gested that diﬀ erences greater than 20 per cent should be 
regarded as unacceptable.
Two groups of 100 farmers – each one treated and one 
control – were formed by matching the propensity scores. The 
remaining 56 farmers, nine subsidised and 47 non-subsidised, 
were excluded from the analysis. Table 2 summarises the sim-
ilarity of treated and control groups before and after matching.
1 Caliper, the allowed diﬀ erence in propensity score, is expressed in standard devia-
tions of average propensity scores.
Members of the two groups of 100 farmers are similar in 
terms of average age of household head (55.5 years for the 
control group cf. 56.5 for the treatment group). Although the 
number of family members working on the farm is slightly 
higher for the control group (2.35) than for the treated group 
(2.30), the diﬀ erence is not statistically signiﬁ cant. Simi-
larity is also observed in terms of education – the median 
value for both groups is 4 (corresponding to agriculture high 
school) and the distribution through the diﬀ erent education 
levels is similar. The average farm size around 15 dynym 
for both groups. The experience in farming is slightly lower 
for the control group (26.7 years) than for the treated group 
(29.5 years) but the diﬀ erence is statistically not signiﬁ cant. 
The groups are also similar in terms of main employment 
with on-farm self-employment being the most frequent 
main employment. In terms of sectors, 109 farmers are olive 
farmers and 91 farmers are vineyard farmers. The allocation 
of farmers by qark is equal for both the control and treated 
groups.
The third stage entails measuring the net treatment eﬀ ect. 
We do so by running simple linear regressions to ﬁ nd out 
whether the subsidy has had any statically signiﬁ cant impact 
(Oakes and Feldman, 2001; Onur, 2006) on the considered 
outcomes. The linear regression takes the form:
 (2)
where Y is the post-score of an outcome variable, α is the 
estimated intercept, X is the pre-test score of the same vari-
able, and T is a dummy variable taking value 1 for treatment 
Table 1: Independent variables or covariates used in the logistic 
regression.
Variable Type Unit of measurement
Age of household head 
(HH)
Scale Years
No. of family members 
working on the farm
Scale Persons
Educational level of 
household head
Ordinal 1 = no education; 
2 = elementary school (four years); 
3 = mandatory school (nine years); 
4 = agricultural high school; 
5 = general / technical high school; 
6 = university
Farm size in 2008 Scale Dynyms*
Experience of HH head 
in the chosen activity
Scale Years
Type of employment Dummy 1 = farming as main employment, 
0 = other employment as main 
employment
Sector dummy Dummy 1 = vineyard; 0 = olives
County (qark**) Dummy 1 = Fier; 0 = Shkodër
* One dynym is equal to 1000 m2
** A qark is a local government unit in charge of regional planning and development.
Source: own composition
Table 2: Statistics for the similarity of treated and control groups 
of farmers before and after using the m.out_caliper 0.25 matching 
procedure.
Before 
matching
After 
matching
Number of observations 256 200
Mean absolute bias 0.08 0.03
Maximum absolute bias 0.29 0.12
N variables with absolute bias > 0.15 2 0
Mean diﬀ erence signiﬁ cant at p < 0.05 0 0
Source: own calculations
Table 3: Dependent and independent variables used to measure net 
treatment eﬀ ect.
Concept Dependent variable
Independent 
variable
Unit of 
measurement
Government 
subsidy
- Subsidy in 2008 Dummy variable, 
taking the value 
1 for treated 
farmers and 0 for 
control farmers
Production 
capacity
Area under olives 
and vineyards 
(2012)
Area under olives 
and vineyards 
(2008)
Dynyms
Technical 
eﬃ  ciency
Yield per hectare 
(2012)
Yield per hectare 
(2008)
Tonnes
Farm size Area per farm 
(2012)
Area per farm 
(2008)
Dynyms
Part-time 
on-farm 
employment
Part-time farmers 
(2012)
Part-time farmers 
(2008)
Number of 
farmers
Source: own composition
Engjell Skreli, Drini Imami, Jámbor Attila, Dmitry Zvyagintsev and Gentjan Çera
122
and 0 for control group. The b2 coeﬃ  cient associated with T 
(Treatment) provides a measure of net treatment eﬀ ect.
Four regressions were run to measure net treatment 
eﬀ ects of government subsidy on production capacity, tech-
nical eﬃ  ciency, farm size and part-time on-farm employ-
ment. The dependent variables are represented by data for 
2012 while the independent variables are represented by 
subsidy in 2008 and data for 2008 (Table 3).
Data
A face-to-face survey of 119 vineyard farmers and 137 
olive farmers was conducted in 2013 using a structured 
questionnaire that was tested and accordingly adjusted 
before being used for data collection. For practical reasons, 
our analysis was conﬁ ned to two counties (Shkodër and 
Fier) out of 12 that made up Albania at that time. The sec-
tors and areas were selected on the basis of three criteria: (a) 
amount of government subsidy – Shkodra and Fier have both 
received signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial support for establishing olives 
and vineyards, and the money allocated to these sectors in 
these counties has been substantial – that to olives has been 
more than half (55 per cent) of all such funding in Fier and 
slightly less than one third (32 per cent) in Shkodër; (b) sec-
tor potential to reveal at least some impact in the four years 
from 2008 to 2012; and (c) regional representativeness, 
considering counties from both southern (Fier) and northern 
(Shkodër) Albania.
Communes and village selection was based on frequency 
of supported beneﬁ ciaries using the information provided 
by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Pro-
tection (MAFCP). Beneﬁ ciaries (subsidised farmers) were 
selected randomly based on lists provided by the Regional 
Department of Agriculture (extension service) while non-
beneﬁ ciaries (non-subsidised farmers) were identiﬁ ed using 
a quasi-random selection, following a random route proce-
dure. Interviews were conducted by well-trained postgradu-
ate students of the Agricultural University of Tiranë. Their 
work was facilitated by MAFCP staﬀ  (extension experts). 
The research team technically supervised the whole process, 
including the survey implementation.
Results
In this section, hypothesis 1 (eﬀ ect of government 
subsidy on production capacity) is operationalised as area 
planted with olives and vineyards, hypothesis 2 (eﬀ ect on 
technical eﬃ  ciency) as olive and vineyard yields per hectare, 
and hypothesis 3 (eﬀ ects on land and labour use) as farm size 
and on-farm employment.
Government subsidy and area planted 
with olives and vineyards
Government subsidy has had a clear, positive impact on 
the area planted with olives and vineyards. The net treatment 
eﬀ ect of subsidy is 4.39 dynyms (Table 4); this diﬀ erence is 
statistically signiﬁ cant as informed by t statistic and related 
p-value associated with Subsidy_2008.
In 2008 the average planted area per farm, 2.5 dynyms 
for subsidised farmers and 3.2 for the non-subsidised farm-
ers, was rather similar for the two groups. The subsidy has 
clearly aﬀ ected the area planted by subsidised farmers: in 
2012 it was 11.0 dynyms, or more than four times larger 
than in 2008. There was also an increase in the planted 
area of non-subsidised farmers but at a signiﬁ cantly lower 
level; it only doubled during the studied period to reach 
7.2 dynyms in 2012. Government subsidy also had a clear 
impact on increasing the number of olive trees and this was 
in line with the ﬁ nding that the area under olives and vines 
had increased.
An average Albanian farm is small (1.2 ha, according to 
MARWDA, 2014), agricultural land is often not fully utilised 
and thereby there is presently a lack of economies of scale. 
The signiﬁ cant net positive impact of government support on 
the olive and vineyard areas highlights the opportunity for 
farmers to beneﬁ t from emerging economies of scale.
Government subsidy and olive 
and vineyard yields
Government subsidy did not have a statistically signiﬁ -
cant impact on crop yield per hectare. The B coeﬃ  cients 
associated with Subsidy_2008 for both the olive and vine-
yard sectors are statistically insigniﬁ cant (Table 5).
Table 4: Impact of government subsidy on area planted with olives 
and vineyards.
Model
Unstandardised 
coeﬃ  cients
Standardised 
coeﬃ  cients t Signiﬁ -canceB Std. error Beta
(Constant) 4.40 0.99 4.43 0.00
Area planted with 
olives and vine-
yards in 2008
0.88 0.14 0.39 6.09 0.00
Subsidy 2008 4.39 1.24 0.22 3.51 0.00
Dependent variable: area planted with olives and vineyards in 2012
Source: own calculations
Table 5: Government subsidy impact on yields per hectare of olives and vineyards.
Activity Model Unstandardised coeﬃ  cients Standardised coeﬃ  cients t Signiﬁ canceB Std. error Beta
Olives (Constant) 1.29 0.95 1.35 0.17
Yield in 2008 0.86 0.10 0.64 8.58 0.00
Subsidy in 2008 0.81 1.28 0.04 0.63 0.52
Vineyards (Constant) 7.62 5.95 1.28 0.20
Yield in 2008 1.97 0.48 0.42 4.09 0.00
Subsidy in 2008 2.43 7.49 0.03 0.32 0.74
Dependent variable: yield in 2012
Source: own calculations
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In 2012, subsidised farmers produced 3.1 t ha-1 of olives 
and 13.1 t ha-1 of grapes, while non-subsidised farmers 
produced 3.8 t ha-1 and 21.1 t ha-1 respectively. Although 
there has been positive development in terms of increasing 
yields per hectare for both groups, no signiﬁ cant net eﬀ ect 
of subsidy was found. This missing net impact of govern-
ment subsidy on crop yields per hectare may be explained if 
considered jointly with an analysis on technology adoption. 
Subsidised famers, as a rule, used common technology in 
terms of cultivars, plant protection materials, pesticides and 
machinery, including sprayers (Skreli and Imami, 2013).
The olive cultivar mix in Albania has undergone major 
changes during the social and economic transition period. 
New intensive cultivars have been introduced and the olive 
cultivar mix is quite modern. In anecdotal cases ‘treated’ 
farmers have introduced new cultivars, but the diﬀ erence 
between subsidised and non-subsidised farmers is not signif-
icant. The grape cultivar mix needs improvement however, 
particularly when it comes to those intended for wine pro-
duction. The government subsidy impact in terms of grape 
cultivar mix remains limited.
The impact of government subsidy on the introduction 
of drip irrigation2 has been negligible when compared to the 
level of investment in drip irrigation technology by the non-
subsidised group (Skreli and Imami, 2013). While one in 
four non-subsidised farmers have introduced drip irrigation 
in olive and grape orchards, the share of subsidised farmers 
who have introduced drip irrigation is only is 16 per cent – a 
substantially lower ﬁ gure.
Commonly-available plant protection materials and 
fertilisers are used both by subsidised and non-subsidised 
farmers, with only a limited number having reported using 
any new types of pesticides or fertiliser, but not necessar-
ily belonging to the subsidised group of farmers. The agri-
cultural machinery, including spraying technology, is very 
similar for both subsidised and non-subsidised farmers, and 
again it is common technology.
Overall, the impact of government subsidy on the intro-
duction of new technology has been weaker than the impact 
of own money spent by farmers to create new olive and grape 
production areas. It could be argued that such a phenomenon 
stems from ‘moral hazard’ – farmers tend to consider the 
soundness of the investment less when they do not have to 
pay the full cost of it. Qualitative information suggests that, 
in some cases, farmers do not provide the necessary services 
to the new plantings after obtaining the subsidy and in a few 
extreme cases they even completely abandon the new plant-
ings (Skreli and Imami, 2013).
Government subsidy and farm size 
and on-farm employment
Government subsidy had no impact on farm size; the net 
impact represented by the coeﬃ  cient B associated with Sub-
sidy_2008 (0.30 dynym) is statistically insigniﬁ cant and the 
p-value of 0.41 suggests however that the result may be due 
to chance (Table 6).
2 Although drip irrigation is not nowadays considered an innovation, its incidence is 
still limited and therefore it is considered a new technology.
The two groups had similar farm sizes in 2008: 15.0 
dynyms for the subsidised farmers and 14.9 dynyms for 
their non-subsidised counterparts. While farm size for non-
subsidised farmers increased by 0.09 dynyms over the period 
2008-2012 (15.1 dynyms in 2012), it increased by 0.39 
dynyms for subsidised farmers (15.4 dynyms in 2012), or a 
net diﬀ erence of 0.3 dynyms. However, the diﬀ erences are 
statistically insigniﬁ cant and can be interpreted as indicating 
a lack of impact of government subsidies on farm size.
Although there are signs of an active land rental mar-
ket, this has not aﬀ ected farm size. In a limited number of 
cases (6 per cent of farmers), subsidised farmers have rented 
land to establish olive and grape production areas. The area 
rented is between 0.5 ha and 2.3 ha. Qualitative informa-
tion from the ﬁ eld interviews supports the idea that the land 
rental market is an opportunity with land managed by rural 
communes. The rental of private land for establishing new 
olive and grape production areas is a rather unlikely option 
given that land ownership titles are perceived to be insecure.
Since reported full-time, on-farm employment is anec-
dotal, only the results of part-time on-farm employment3 are 
discussed below. Government subsidy has had a substantial 
signiﬁ cant impact on increasing on-farm part-time employ-
ment (Table 7).
The two groups of farms had similar values in terms 
of part-time employment per farm in 2008: 0.74 part-time 
farmers for non-subsidised farmers and 0.99 part-time farm-
ers for subsidised farmers. While subsidised farms employed 
on average 1.80 part time employees, non-subsidised farm-
ers employed only 1.23 employees. Although there was an 
increase in part-time on-farm employment for both groups, 
that for the subsidised group was signiﬁ cantly higher than 
for the non-subsidised group, the net diﬀ erence being 0.36 
part-time employees per farm. The results by sector suggest 
that the increases in part-time on-farm employment for both 
the olive and vineyard sectors were signiﬁ cant, with slightly 
higher values for the vineyard sector.
3 Part-time workers in the olive and vineyard sectors deal mainly with some speciﬁ c 
operations such as land tilling, pruning and fruit picking. Based on expert assessment, 
‘part time’ in the considered sectors may be converted to at most 0.25 AWU.
Table 6: Government subsidy impact on farm size.
Model
Unstandardised 
coeﬃ  cients
Standardised 
coeﬃ  cients t Signiﬁ -canceB Std. error Beta
(Constant) 0.36 0.38  0.95 0.34
Farm size in 2008 0.98 0.01 0.96 51.68 0.00
Subsidy in 2008 0.30 0.37 0.01  0.81 0.41
Dependent variable: farm size in 2012
Source: own calculations
Table 7: Government subsidy impact on part-time, on-farm 
employment.
Unstandardised 
coeﬃ  cients
Standardised 
coeﬃ  cients t Signiﬁ -canceB Std. error Beta
(Constant) 0.63 0.14  4.37 0.00
Part time farmers 
in 2008 0.80 0.06 0.65 12.40 0.00
Subsidy in 2008 0.36 0.19 0.10  1.89 0.05
Dependent variable: part time farmers in 2012
Source: own calculations
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Discussion
This paper analyses the outcomes and possible impact 
of Albanian farm subsidy schemes using a quasi-experi-
mental design by applying PSM method. The results show 
that the government subsidy scheme had a clear net impact 
on increasing areas under olive and grape production. The 
positive impact on area planted with olives and vines had 
not aﬀ ected farm size, however. Furthermore, the impact of 
subsidies on part-time on-farm employment was positive, 
while its impacts on technology adoption and crop yield per 
hectare were not signiﬁ cant.
Our results are generally in line with the majority of 
the cited literature, showing that agricultural subsidy pro-
grammes have a rather mixed impact. We found that Alba-
nia’s agricultural subsidy policy had a direct impact on 
production capacities (area and production), suggesting an 
‘early stage’ for the Albanian agricultural sector. The results 
regarding impact on technical eﬃ  ciency are in line with those 
of Minviel and Latruﬀ e (2014) and Zhu and Lansink (2010), 
who found mixed relationships between agricultural subsi-
dies and eﬃ  ciency. As expected, subsidy positively aﬀ ects 
part-time on-farm employment but no signiﬁ cant impact was 
found in terms of bringing idle land into the economic cycle, 
contrary to what we hypothesised.
Supporting investment in new fruit production areas 
became part of the Albanian policy agenda only recently, 
starting from 2008. Impact evaluation of the scheme in 2012, 
only four years from its start, is an important limitation of 
the study. Despite the assumption that this is a suﬃ  cient time 
frame for the scheme to have an impact, we are aware that 
that only partial impacts are discussed and analysed. This 
is due to the fact that although intensive olives and vine-
yards enter production by the third year, they only reach full 
production by the sixth or seventh year. The results most 
aﬀ ected by this limitation are yields per hectare and the least 
are area planted with olives and vineyards, and employment. 
Another limitation of the study is the small sample size 
which is likely to lead to higher margins of error. Further-
more, despite our balanced selection of counties (south and 
north), random selection of communes and quasi-random 
selection of farmers prompts caution about generalising the 
results at the country level. On the other hand, given the lack 
of baseline data, the study looks at the selected indicators 
only in retrospect, meaning using self-reported data from 
farmers related to their performance in recent years.
Our research ﬁ ndings can be relevant for government 
agencies and other stakeholders which have engaged or plan 
to engage in investment support schemes in the Albanian 
agriculture sector. It is recommended the government contin-
ues its support for creating new fruit production areas. Given 
the small average farm size, Albanian agriculture needs sup-
port to establish commercial farms and the current scheme is 
an eﬀ ective way to link small farms with markets. A measure 
which is an investment support scheme is superior to output/
price support – it is less trade distortive and has a lower neg-
ative budget impact. Caution should be made of the complex 
eﬀ ect in the longer run, however. As the domestic market 
may saturate for diﬀ erent products, further increased pro-
duction may cause a sharp decline in sales prices which can 
make the farmers’ ﬁ nancial situation worse oﬀ . Therefore, 
support schemes for given agricultural activities should be 
anticipated by an in-depth market outlook.
Support to investment in labour-intensive industries, if 
well designed, tends to aﬀ ect farm income and employment 
generation positively. Our study results support that there 
is a signiﬁ cant increase in part-time on-farm employment, 
meaning that the subsidy scheme has had a positive impact 
in terms of addressing the hidden unemployment problem 
which is a critical one for Albanian agriculture.
Our survey data suggest that a large proportion of farm-
ers have not mobilised any additional resources after beneﬁ t-
ing from government subsidies and new technology adop-
tion has been limited. The study ﬁ ndings may be used to 
encourage the government to introduce conditionality – to 
use subsidy to meet more than one policy objective. Recom-
mended policy objectives to be followed are new technology 
adoption and ﬁ nancial resource mobilisation.
While the rental market of private land is dysfunctional, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers rent the commune-
managed land for establishing new fruit production areas. 
The government may therefore design a policy to promote 
the use of commune-managed land for this purpose. The 
policy mix should consider reducing local government dis-
cretion in renting out the land, designing incentives for local 
government based on land transactions, and providing bonus 
points in ﬁ le evaluations in case of local government man-
aged land rented, to mention only a few possible measures.
Skreli and Imami (2013) found that for 25 per cent of 
subsidised farmers, investment is equal or close to the level 
of the government subsidy, meaning that no additional 
resources are mobilised. Additionally, the impact of subsi-
dies in introducing new technologies is signiﬁ cantly lower 
than the impact of farmers’ own money. Based on these facts 
it is argued that a ‘moral hazard’ problem is associated with 
government subsidy. More in-depth investigation is however 
suggested in order to better understand this phenomenon.
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